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| Lieutenant Charles Hazlett |
After the
Battle of Antietam, Henry Hunt the new Chief of Artillery for the Army of the
Potomac directed that an inspection be conducted of every artillery battery in
the army. Hunt’s papers in the Library
of Congress contain detailed records of that first inspection.[1] Included
are reports from some 33 artillery batteries from every army corps but the
Sixth.[2]
Lieutenant Colonel Charles Wainwright himself newly
appointed to the same post in the First Corps conducted inspections for that
command and reported his findings on October 6th. Lieutenant Alonzo Cushing at the time on
Sumner’s staff as the topographical engineer inspected Second and Twelfth Corps
artillery units. He submitted his report
on October 8th. Lieutenant
Samuel Benjamin who commanded a 20-pound Parrott battery in the Ninth Corps completed
reports for is corps on October 23rd. Finally Lieutenant Colonel
Alexander Webb, inspector general of the Fifth Corps reviewed the artillery
batteries of Porter’s corps and submitted his report the next day. Webb’s reports are the most comprehensive of
the group.
These officers evaluated the condition of the guns, limbers
and caissons. Did the company possess the basic load of 250 rounds per gun and
was it properly and safely packed?
Inspectors carefully checked the health and care of artillery
horses. Was there a proper supply of
forage and hay? Were harnesses properly
cared for? Were there enough artillery
implements and tools for the guns? Were there enough tents? Did the brigade and/or division
quartermasters and commissary officers attend to the needs of the company?
They looked at the condition and cleanliness of the
men. Were they all equipped and
effective for combat? How was their military bearing? Was new clothing available? Did they have their knapsacks? Were officers and men receiving daily
recitations of Army Regulations and tactics? How many times a day did the
officers and sergeants conduct calls, drill and guard mount?
Did the commander accurately account for all company property? Were his company books and returns accurate
and complete? Was his camp laid out correctly
and properly policed? Where was the
nearest hospital tent? Finally was the
commander effectively in charge? The
inspector ended each inspection with a sentence to the effect that the battery
was or was not “efficient.”
Though the report narrative for each category is very brief,
sometimes just one or two words, the reports are surprisingly
comprehensive. They draw a fascinating picture
of the condition of the Union artillery immediately following the Battle of
Antietam.
Generally the guns and accouterments were very well
maintained and most batteries had their basic load of 250 rounds per gun. One exception was Monroe’s Rhode Island Battery
which was about 70 rounds short for each gun though the battery had stashed a
larger than authorized amount of canister.
It was no wonder considering what Monroe had been through in the past 60
days. His battery was nearly overrun at
Second Manassas and there had been some dicey moments at Antietam too.
The biggest problem was the number and condition of the
horses. Many of the batteries did not
have enough horses. The army was in the
process of condemning unfit horses. They
were in short supply and “smallish.” In
the Ninth Corps, the horses were coming down with what Lieutenant Benjamin
called greasy heel. This was a bacterial disease caused by insufficient diet,
exposure to dampness, and rough riding conditions.[3] Benjamin reported that many batteries in his
corps were short of horseshoes. Overall,
there were many reports that the supply of hay was inadequate.
Many batteries were in need of clothing for the men. In the
weeks after the battle McClellan and the Union quartermaster general Montgomery
Meigs were engaged in a barrage of telegrams on the logistics situation. Meigs maintained that adequate stocks had
been shipped to the army. McClellan and
his quartermaster Rufus Ingalls disagreed.
Whatever the case, new clothing was not reaching some of the artillery
batteries.
The regular batteries were generally rated the most military
in bearing and drill. Several of them
only had one officer on hand. Charles
Hazlett was the only officer in Battery D, Fifth Artillery. James Stewart in
Battery B, Fourth Artillery was another case in point. Wainwright pointedly
noted also that Battery B was comprised almost entirely of volunteers. Of the 140 enlisted men, 123 or 93% were of
volunteers. Ransom’s regular battery
lost all of their books (company records) at Second Bull Run. In the Second Corps, Evan Thomas’ Battery A, Fourth Artillery had moved
out of Washington so quickly at the beginning of the Maryland Campaign that
they left their knapsacks containing all their personal clothing on barge
at Georgetown. The men had essentially
been in the same clothes for six weeks.
A good volunteer battery was Matthew’s Battery F, First
Pennsylvania Light Artillery. This fine outfit stood firm in the Cornfield
along with Ransom and Stewart and was instrumental in halting the Confederate
attacks there. Wainwright found
discipline excellent, a rating hard to earn from that very finicky officer.
Then there was Company L, First Ohio Light Artillery. This was a new battery that arrived after
Antietam to add an artillery complement to Humphrey’s Third Division of the
Fifth Corps. It had not seen a lot of
action. It was with Shield’s division in
the Department of the Rappahannock and for most of the summer and fall had been
in the Washington defenses. Its
commander was Lieutenant
Frederick Dorries. Lieutenant
Colonel Webb found the battery “decidedly unmilitary on parade…the command was
overall inefficient, officers were not well acquainted with their duties…the Orderly Sergeant does
not wear chevrons and lives with commissioned officers; he does not know
duties, property is not accounted for, no training offered, files not complete,
This battery is in miserable condition owing to the inefficiency of the
officers.” It was left to be seen whether this battery would be ready for
action before the next campaign.
While Dorries’ battery had a lot of work to do to meet Henry
Hunt’s standards, there was one battery that stood out. This battery was organized by Charles Griffin,
an artillery instructor at United States Military Academy at the start of the
war and was comprised of West Point artillery soldiers, and such graduates of
the Class of 1861 as Henry Kingsbury, Adelbert Ames and Charles Hazlett. From this pedigree, it became known as the
West Point Battery. Battery D, Fifth U.S. Artillery made its first appearance
at First Bull Run under Griffin where it lost its guns in the climactic
struggle on Henry Hill. When Griffin
took command of an infantry brigade in Morell’s division, his gunners found a
place as the regular army battery assigned to that command. The battery did well
under Henry Kingsbury at Gaines Mill and Malvern Hill. Kingsbury would credit the battery’s success
to “Hazlett’s unwearied
exertions
of preparation.”[4] While Ames and Kingsbury eventually accepted
volunteer commissions to command the 20th Maine and 11th Connecticut Infantry respectively, Hazlett remained with the artillery. The young Ohioan led his gunners at Second
Manassas firing over 1,000 rounds of ammunition and barely escaping capture
while supporting Gouveneur Warren’s Fifth New York Infantry as it was nearly
destroyed by rampaging Confederates.[5] At Antietam the battery was part of Henry
Hunt’s line of guns of position and remained east of the creek during the battle. Hazlett and his men were deeply saddened to
learn the news of the death of Kingsbury who fell leading his regiment at the
Burnside Bridge. On September 19th and 20th the Battery D
participated in the artillery duel during Battle of Shepherdstown where the men
were overjoyed to learn that Griffin’s infantry recaptured one of their lost
Bull Run guns.
Webb a graduate of West Point in 1855 was a Second Artillery
officer before the war and aide to former Chief of Artillery William Barry. He was thoroughly qualified to inspect the
artillery batteries of the Fifth Corps. As
he began the inspection of Hazlett’s battery, he noted several times in his
report that the lieutenant was the only officer present.[6] Despite this he found the battery’s six
10-pound Parrots in good condition, the ammunition in perfect order, horses
and caissons in very good condition, the men well supplied with clothing and
the command overall very efficient and orderly. Company records were all in
hand and well kept and the camp was “in admirable police; the neatest in the artillery of the corps.” The only problems were not in the battery
itself but with the Quartermaster Department in that the wants of the battery
are not normally anticipated. Overall Webb pronounced the battery is in
admirable condition but pointedly indicated that it needed five officers.
Hazlett’s “unwearied exertions of preparation”
continued to maintain the West Point Battery as one of the finest in the Army
of the Potomac.
In nine months Alexander Webb would lead the Philadelphia
Brigade to immortality at the Copse of Trees at Gettysburg on July 3rd
1863. He would live another 48 years,
honored and respected for his key role in the Union victory at that important
battle. Charles Hazlett would not fare
so well. The day before Pickett’s charge, a rebel sharpshooter killed Hazlett on
Little Round Top. While leaning close to
catch the dying words of his friend and fellow artilleryman Stephen Weed,
Hazlett was struck by a bullet in the forehead and died instantly. He was 24 years old.
The findings of Hunt’s artillery inspectors should not always
be completely regarded as a bad reflection on the battery commanders. Like their Confederate counterparts, the
artillerymen of the Army of the Potomac had been marching and fighting
continuously since the end of May. The
Second, Fifth and Sixth Corps had seen hard fighting on the Peninsula. The First, and Twelfth were veterans of the
tough fights at Cedar Mountain and at earlier battles with Stonewall Jackson’s
Valley Army in the spring. The First,
Fifth, Ninth and Twelfth fought hard at Second Manassas. The continuous marching, and fighting
stretched the logistic network to its limit.
Men, horses and equipment were worn out.
Hunt’s series of inspections gave him and his officers a snapshot on the
overall condition of the command and a place to start from in the rebuilding of
the artillery corps of the Army of the Potomac.
[1] Henry Hunt Papers, Library of Congress Box 7 Folder 6
(October – December 1862)
[2] 1st Corps 10 batteries, 5th Corps
9 batteries, 9th Corps 7 batteries, 2nd & 12th
Corps 7 batteries
[3] Collea, Joseph The
First Vermont Cavalry in the Civil War: A History Jefferson NC: Jefferson McFarland
and Company 2010, page 92
[4] OR 11:2 page 286 Report
of Lieut. Henry W. Kingsbury, Battery D, Fifth U.S. Artillery, of the battles
of Gaines Mill and Malvern Hill
[5] OR 12:2 page 468 Reports
of Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett, Battery D, Fifth U.S. Artillery, of the battles
of Groveton and Bull Run
[6] Of the other officers, Captain Griffin was commanding the brigade in Morell’s division, Lieutenants Harrison and Bolles were sick,
Lieutenant Reed was on recruiting duty and Lieutenant Hascall was on
detached service with the Quartermaster Department. Source: October 1862 Monthly Return
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