Sumner and the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War

One of the best books I have ever read on the Battle of Antietam is Unfurl Those Colors by Vince Armstrong. While the book focuses primarily on the actions of the Second Corps in the Maryland Campaign, it also provides a detailed description of the decision making process of George B. McClellan during that campaign. While this book does not provide a comparative exhaustive analysis like Joseph Harsh made of Lee’s actions in Maryland, it is nevertheless the most fair and unbiased account of George B. McClellan’s operational planning and battlefield decision-making that is currently available. Read it with the chapters on the Maryland Campaign found Ethan Rafuse’s McClellan’s War to get a good picture of McClellan’s operational designs. Hopefully the McClellan version of Taken at the Flood will be written some day.

In the process of reading the book, I added 269 new quotes to my database. As part of my collection regimen, I examine the footnotes that are attached to every quote. One of the references is the Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War - Part One - Army of the Potomac. Dominated by the Radical Republicans, the Joint Committee was originally comprised to examine the Union disaster at Balls Bluff but quickly expanded its charter to look into any and all battlefield operations of the Union Army where it could reap political capital. A favorite target of the Committee was the campaigns of General George McClellan.

If you are willing to work through it, there is some fascinating reading there. Beginning on page 359 is the particularly interesting testimony of Edwin Sumner. He had been called to testify on his entire tenure in the Army of the Potomac. Sumner’s testimony runs for twelve pages with the last three devoted to the Maryland Campaign. Sumner testified on February 18, 1862 in Washington DC. He was on his way to take command of the Department of Missouri.

Three committee members questioned Sumner. They were the committee chair, Ben Wade, (R-Ohio), and Congressmen John Covode (R-Pennsylvania), and Daniel Gooch (R-Massachusetts). There were other members on the committee including several Democrats but none of them apparently were present or asked any questions.

Below is Sumner’s testimony. I have inserted some personal observations in the form of endnotes that I found of interest.

By the Chairman:

Question. Will you now go on and give us a brief and concise history of the Maryland campaign?

Answer: The day after we reached the Potomac I was ordered to place my command in camp at Tenallytown. I remained there three days, and was ordered then to advance. The following day General Banks s corps was added to my command. My command was on the extreme right of the army as it advanced. We were not engaged at South Mountain, but continued on until we reached Antietam. One division of my second corps, under Richardson, was drawn up within shelling distance of the enemy, and I lost some men there and one or two valuable officers. The second night after our arrival there I was informed that General Hooker had been ordered to advance towards the left of the enemy with his corps. In the evening I was ordered to send forward General Mansfield, with Banks s corps, to the support of Hooker, and to hold my own corps in readiness to march an hour before daylight. It was ready at that time, but I did not receive the order to advance until twenty minutes past seven o clock in the morning.

On going upon the field I found that General Hooker s corps had been dispersed and routed.[i] I passed him some distance in the rear, where he had been carried wounded, but I saw nothing of his corps at all as I was advancing with my command on the field. There were some troops lying down on the left which I took to belong to Mansfield’s command.[ii] In the meantime General Mansfield had been killed, and a portion of his corps (formerly Banks s) had also been thrown into confusion. Sedgwick’s division was led by myself on the right of Banks corps. We sustained a very heavy fire there for some time. The enemy made a very desperate attempt to turn our left, and the fire became so severe that even my right division faced from it and marched at least a third of a mile before I could stop them[iii]. They did not break, but marched off in columns from the fire. They were then halted and placed in a position which was held. My two other divisions, French s and Richardson s, drove the enemy a considerable distance and never retreated an inch. I have always believed[iv] that, instead of sending these troops into that action in driblets, as they were sent, if General McClellan had authorized me to march these 40,000 men on the left flank of the enemy, we could not have failed to throw them right back in front of the other divisions of our army on our left, Burnside’s, Franklin’s, and Porter’s corps; as it was, we went in, division after division, until even one of my own divisions was forced out. The other two drove the enemy and held their positions. My intention at the time was to have proceeded entirely on by their left and moved down, bringing them right in front of Burnside, Franklin, and Porter[v].

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. And all escape for the enemy would have been impossible?

Answer. I think so.

By the Chairman:

Question. Why was not that done?

Answer. I do not know; perhaps the general thought it was better to bring one corps at a time into action.

Question. How came our divisions to be forced back in that way; did they attack superior numbers?

Answer. At the points of attack the enemy was superior.[vi] General Hooker’s corps was dispersed; there is no question about that. I sent one of my own staff-officers to find where they were; and General Ricketts, the only officer we could find, said that he could not raise 300 men of the corps.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. This was after General Hooker was wounded?

Answer. Yes, sir; he was some distance in the rear, having his wound dressed.

By Mr. Covode:

Question. What was the number engaged on each side in that battle:

Answer. I supposed at the time that we were about equal at Antietam. I believe the enemy say otherwise; but it was my belief, from all that I could see and hear on the field, that there were about 80,000 men on each side there.[vii]

By the Chairman:

Question. Who were victorious in that battle?

Answer. We were. We held the ground upon which the battle was fought, and the enemy retreated.[viii]

Question. What was the reason we did not destroy that army after its defeat at Antietam?

Answer. It had been a very severe action uncommonly severe. My own corps lost something over 5,000 men that day in killed and wounded, and some of the other corps lost very nearly as much. Troops are not exactly prepared to make a rapid pursuit the next day after such a battle as that. And another reason was this, I believe, General McClellan knew that re-enforcements were on the march to him, being pushed up as rapidly as possible; and he knew, probably, that the enemy should receive no reinforcements; therefore he thought proper to pause a little after that severe battle before he pressed the enemy. There is a great deal to be done after an action of that kind. It takes a day or two to look about you a little, to collect the dead and wounded, and take care of them. Knowing that these re-enforcements were on the march from Washington, I thought it was prudent for the general to halt a little after that severe action until his re-enforcements came up.

Question. The enemy had a difficult river to cross, and there was no opposition to their crossing the river, I believe?

Answer. It was not very difficult for them to cross it. They could ford it in many places.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. When did you first learn that the enemy were retreating, after that battle?

Answer. I believe it was the second night after the action.

Question. Were our forces in a condition to pursue, when you found that the enemy had commenced their retreat?

Answer. You mean before they got across the river?

Question. Yes, sir; as the information reached you that they had begun to retreat.

Answer. That is a difficult question to answer. With old regular troops, tried men, a night attack upon the enemy there would have been successful; but there is a great deal of risk in making night attacks with new troops.

By Mr. Covode:

Question. What prevented General Porter s corps from attacking the enemy?

Were they not in condition to attack?

Answer. I do not know about that. I know there was some disappointment on the part of General Burnside about it.[ix]

Question. Were they engaged in that fight at all?

Answer. I think not. I think they were held as reserves.

By the Chairman:

Question. There was a great deal of delay in pursuing the enemy after they had recrossed the river, and after you had received your re-enforcements. What caused that delay?

Answer. I do not know. A large army is a very unwieldy machine to move.

It takes a great deal of time to organize the means of transportation, procure supplies, &c. Scarcely any man can move 100,000 men without making very close calculations, and an inexperienced man cannot make those calculations. I do not know the reason for the delay, unless it may have been thought necessary to reorganize and refit the army; and whether that could have been done in less time or not I am not prepared to say.[x]

Question. What effect had the surrender of Harper s Ferry upon the battle of Antietam?

Answer. The 30,000 of the enemy who took Harper s Ferry came up to Antietam and took part in the action there.[xi]

Question. When the army moved from Washington in pursuit of Lee, in your opinion, what should have been our line of movement?

Answer. I think it would have been much better for our whole army to have gone right up to Harper s Ferry, on the south side of the Potomac, and left Pennsylvania to take care of Lee, we would then have come right in rear of the enemy.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Was that your opinion at the time?

Answer. Yes, sir; but I did not express it.[xii]

Question. In what light did you regard the crossing of Lee into Maryland?

Answer. I think the movement of our whole army up the Potomac would have led to the rapid retreat of Lee across the Potomac.

Question. I mean, did you regard Lee s movement as a good or a bad military movement?

Answer. I think it might have been made a very hazardous movement for him.[xiii]

We have to remember that testifying before a Congressional Committee then, like now can be a very dangerous situation for a military man. The radical republicans under Ben Wade control this committee and they are using it as a political hammer to discredit generals who do not display an adequate level of fervor for the cause. Sumner is not particularly identified with any political faction. His credibility comes from a 43-year career in the United States Army holding positions of increasing trust and responsibility.

As an epilogue, Sumner never made it to Missouri. No doubt weakened by a year of active campaigning in the field, Sumner died of pneumonia at his daughter’s home in Syracuse New York only 33 days after testifying.

---

[i] In testimony before the Congressional committee, Sumner describes Hooker’s Corps as being routed. In his official report dated October 1, 1862, he reports Hooker’s corps, “after a severe contest, had been repulsed.” Note the more negative description in testimony before the committee. By now, Hooker was commander of the Army of the Potomac. Sumner had no love for Hooker.

[ii] The soldiers that Sumner observed laying down on the left were Greene’s division of the Twelfth Corps.

[iii] Sumner takes pains in choosing his words to describe the attack On Sedgwick’s division. He calls it a severe attack and that division faced from it and marched at least a third of a mile before I could stop them. He says that the division did not break but marched in columns to a new defensive position. The connotation is of an orderly, even planned withdrawal.

[iv] It sounds like Sumner wanted to lead all the forces on the right, (his own wing consisting of the Second and Twelfth corps and Hooker’s command in one crushing attack instead as he put it in driblets.

[v] At the battlefield tactical level, Sumner clearly states his intention was to proceed around the enemy left and drive them in front of Franklin, Porter, and Burnside.

[vi] Sumner believed that Hooker faced superior numbers when he went in.

[vii] Sumner believed that there were about an equal number of Federals and Confederate, around 80,000 at the battle.

[viii] Sumner calls the battle a Union victory because the Army of the Potomac held the ground after Lee withdrew.

[ix] Sumner mentions Burnside’s disappointment that Porter did not participate in the attack. Burnside was under the impression that he could call upon Porter for assistance during the battle. When the time came and he requested reinforcements on September 17^th, McClellan was only willing to offer him a battery. Sumner mentioning this must imply that Burnside’s disappointment was at least known at the corps commander level if not lower.

[x] The fact that Sumner can’t describe the reason for the delay in pursuing Lee speaks to his diminished role in the Army. Though the senior major general in the Army of the Potomac, McClellan never brought Sumner into his inner circle and explained his reasons for not pursuing Lee immediately. Sumner is left to draw his own conclusions.

[xi] Sumner ascribes the Confederate force that captured Harpers Ferry as having about 30,000 men. Special Order 191 described Longstreet’s force as the “main body” of the Confederate Army. If Sumner was privy to any of McClellan’s thoughts on responding to the discovery of these orders, he may have felt that Longstreet had around 50,000 men under his command.

[xii] At the operational level, Sumner apparently opposed McClellan’s plan to advance in a northwesterly direction across a wide front into western Maryland. He favored advancing along the south bank of the Potomac to Harpers Ferry to cut off the advancing rebels. He never expressed his opinion.

[xiii] Sumner viewed Lee’s audacious advance into Maryland as a “very hazardous movement.”

Another Marine Milestone

As justice was finally dispensed to Osama Bin Laden this past weekend it caused me to pause and reflect once again on the spirit, accomplishments and capabilities of the awesome young men and women in our armed forces, I am proud to again post on the latest status of my son Jim, a young Marine enlisted man. Jim as you may recall completed Marine Corps boot camp at Parris Island SC on December 3. After spending the holidays with us, he departed for Marine Combat Training at Camp Geiger NC, which he completed at the end of January. Jim then headed for Pensacola Naval Air Station where he began his initial aviation training to be an aviation safety systems mechanic. I am proud to say that Jim completed this training and did a great job. He got to select the aircraft that he will specialize in and it is the AV-8B Harrier. Jim graduated today from the course at Pensacola and will depart for Cherry Point NC for specialized training on the Harrier on Friday. After this training, Jim is looking forward to getting to his permanent duty station and joining he fleet! Words cannot express the pride that I have in him. Well-done Marine.

For links to my other post on Jim’s service, check here, and here, and here.

3,018 Quotes

I am excited to have added the 3,018th quote to my database today. Read more about the process at Antietam Voices. I have also updated the George McClellan page and you can see 272 quotes about McClellan made by him and his contemporaries. I hope to similarly update the other principal Antietam commanders and also the quotes that apply to specific areas of the fighting in the upcoming weeks. Check it out.

New Blog: Our Country's Fiery Ordeal

Check out Antietam seasonal ranger Dan Vermilya's new blog Our Country's Fiery Ordeal here. I have added Dan's blog to my list on the right.

I got to know Dan last year when he started working at the park. He is a serious student of Civil War history and of the Battle of Antietam in particular. I think you will find his perspectives interesting and instructive. I look forward to working with Dan again this summer and wish him the best on this endeavor. The picture at the left is from Dan's photo collection.

A New Book on the Battle of Antietam

Last week, the Western Maryland Interpretive Association (WMIA) published the latest in its series of books on various aspects of the Civil War in this part of Maryland. Already released are volumes on the Battle of Monocacy, and the Antietam Farmsteads. Joining these titles is the Battle of Antietam September 17, 1862.

The latest work is a collaborative work of two Antietam rangers. John Hoptak wrote the copy for the book. Keith Snyder designed the layout, maps, and charts and masterfully enhanced the photographs and drawings that grace the book.

The book is more than just a tale of the bloody events of September 17, 1862 as the title would have you believe. It is the story of the entire Maryland Campaign told from its very beginnings on September 4, 1862 when the seemingly invincible legions of the Army of the Northern Virginia crossed the Potomac, to the retreat of the battered Confederate Army and the rearguard Battle of Shepherdstown fifteen days later.

John Hoptak has already established his reputation as an authority and well-regarded author on a range of Civil War topics. His challenge here was to reduce the Maryland Campaign and the Battle of Antietam to about 60 pages of text. The remaining 20 or so pages are the excellent maps, charts, and photos.

The result is a well-crafted overview of the campaign and a more detailed survey of the battle on September 17^th, 1862. The Battle of South Mountain and Confederate capture of Harper’s Ferry as well as the events of the two days leading up to the battle are addressed. John’s treatment of George McClellan is fair and balanced and thankfully devoid of much of the stereotype that we see in much of the literature of this important figure. Likewise we see the battle from the perspective of Robert E. Lee and understand his decision to stand and fight outnumbered and with his back to the Potomac.

John covers the battle in about 30 pages. We see it not as a series of unrelated events on different parts of the battlefield as it is sometimes portrayed but as a seamless weaving together of the story with a good appreciation of how it all tied in together. Lesser-known parts of the battle are included, like Lee’s planned attack in the left in the afternoon, and the September 16 twilight action in the East Woods.

Given John’s penchant for biography, we are treated to brief vignettes of the principal commanders on both sides throughout the narrative.

Keith Snyder did a tremendous job with the maps. There are six for the battle itself covering different times of the battle. The maps really enforce the fact that there was action along the entire line for the entire day. They capture key elements of terrain, contour, and movement in a way that I haven’t seen before. I have already photocopied and laminated copies and stuck them in my already bulging guide haversack. Keith created several great organization charts that distill a great amount of information; he did a wonderful job touching up the photographs and drawings providing a new level of crispness and clarity to images many of us have seen in other works. There is also interesting information on the development of the park, presidential visits to the battlefield, and much more.

Without hopefully sounding to pompous, I cannot say that there was much new that I learned about the Battle of Antietam here. But the story is faithfully and accurately told. John and Keith have reduced an immensely complicated event in our history into a readable and informative work that should have widespread appeal and excite interest in new readers young and old on the topic. They got it right.

In the days and months ahead as I take groups out on tours I will as I sometimes do, find myself at a loss for words on how to reduce a complicated concept or event to an easier to understand level. When that happens I will reach for my copy of this very good book.

Taken at the Flood

Pardon the pun. Yesterday a powerful storm dumped around two inches of rain on the Potomac River valley. The mountain back roads that I drive over Crampton’s Gap and Red Hill enroute to the park this morning were awash in gravel and rivulets from the storm. Modern Burnside Bridge Road was closed for a time due to the high water. I was anxious to see the Antietam Creek at the Burnside Bridge. There, I shot some video of the high water passing under the bridge. The video was taken from the east (Union) side of the bridge this morning.

While there, I talked with Ranger Rory Moore who told me that lightning struck the observation tower on the Sunken Road (Richardson Avenue) melting the padlock and chain on the tower gate. The photo (left) of the lock doesn’t clearly show that but the lightning certainly fried it.

Our line was throbbing at every point, so that I dared not call on General Lee for help

Last month, the Save Historic Antietam Foundation (SHAF) held its annual spring workday. This year, we continued to clear brush and trees from the Piper Farm Lane. The lane runs east from the Hagerstown Pike past the farm and eventually along an intermittent stream to Richardson Avenue.

As we got started, SHAF President Tom Clemens gave us a history lesson about this area. As Tom said, most people think that after D.H. Hill’s two brigades and elements of Richard Anderson’s division were driven from the Sunken Road between noon and 1PM on September 17, 1862, that no organized resistance was formed south of that line. The reality is that Tom calls this a second Sunken Road of sorts.

This area is bounded on the north by the Sunken Road, on the west by the Hagerstown Pike, and on the south by the Piper Farm Lane. From the farmhouse looking northwest, there are a number of prominent limestone rock formations that are gouged out of the farmland. Running roughly from southwest to northeast, these ledges were carved out of the land by the glaciers and are part of the same fault line that created the limestone rock ledge that I have posted about previously. They are noted on the Copes-Carmen maps to the left. Between the ground immediately behind the Sunken Road, and the Piper Lane, the terrain dips into a swale that forms the start of an intermittent stream that runs when the water is high eastward to the Antietam.

Some popular connotations are that defeated and demoralized rebel troops milled around leaderless and demoralized in this area. We are not helped by the fact that there are no reports of the battle by Confederate division-commander Richard Anderson or any of his subordinate commanders. However, if we look at the Carmen-Copes maps, we see that there are organized Confederate forces manning the Piper line. In fact, there is a lot of Confederate artillery in the area for much of the day. This post will discuss some of that Confederate artillery and in combination with maps and my photos try to paint a picture of the area around the Piper Farm that day.

In the 9:00 AM Carmen-Copes map, Weber’s brigade of French’s division is approaching the Sunken Road. Primarily, two brigades of Daniel Harvey Hill’s division defend the road. Robert Rode’s Alabama brigade is on the left, and George B. Anderson’s North Carolina brigade is on the right. In front of Rode’s brigade is Captain Robert Boyce’s (Macbeth) South Carolina Battery of Nathan Shank’s Independent Brigade. This battery consisted of six guns. The type of guns is not mentioned in the OR, Carmen, or in Johnson and Anderson’s Artillery Hell. However, in recent correspondence that I have had with Warren Scott, Ordnance Sergeant and reenactor of the modern day Macbeth Artillery in it seems likely that the guns of that battery were six-pound howitzers. Boyce reports that he spent the night of September 16^th in a hollow in the rear of Cemetery hill. Colonel James B. Walton of the Washington Artillery Battalion ordered the battery to meet and check the enemy in a position north of the Keedysville Road. Boyce moved there and was placed by Colonel P.F. Stevens, of the Holcombe Legion and acting commander of Evan’s brigade in a position around the Piper Farm that Boyce found to be unsuitable for engaging the enemy. Boyce apparently moved forward at least one more time moving through a cornfield to a position shown on the 9AM Copes-Carmen map as being north of Robert Rode’s brigade. By 10:30, he was south of the Sunken Road and west of the Piper Orchard (see 10:30 AM map). Boyce reports that at Lee’s order, he engaged an enemy battery to his left at the extreme limits of range and forced it to relocate.[1] But Boyce’s saved most of his effort for the advancing Federal infantry of French and Richardson’s division. Throughout the morning, he engaged them reporting that he fired 80 rounds of canister and solid shot. D.H. Hill was an artilleryman in the Regular Army during the Mexican War and took an active role in the placement of his guns. Hill was never shy about criticizing the employment of artillery by others (calling the artillery duel on September 16 between powerful Union batteries and the Confederate Washington artillery “the most melancholy farce of the war.”)[2] But he was very complimentary of Boyce’s action “the battery moved out most gallantly...and with grape and canister drove the enemy back was instrumental in halting the Union advance from the old road which he had occupied in the morning, and occupied a cornfield and orchard in advance of it.” Longstreet too said the Union attack was met by two pieces of Captain Miller’s battery of the Washington Artillery, and two pieces of Captain Boyce’s battery and was driven back in some confusion.[3] They [Federals] had got to within a few hundred yards of the hill which commanded Sharpsburg and our rear.”[4] Boyce’s last position in the Piper Lane area (see 1:00 PM map) was at the eastern end of the lane facing the creek. Here the 18^th South Carolina Infantry provided infantry support. By then, losses of men, equipment, and horses had reduced Boyce to being able to man only two guns when he was sent further south to confront Burnside’s advance. Boyce lost 4 killed, and fifteen wounded. He also lost 15 horses killed.

At 9:00 AM, the other principle Confederate artillery element in the area was Major Hilary Pollard Jones’ Artillery Battalion of the Artillery General Reserve. Interestingly, Jones’s son, Hilary Pollard Jones Jr., born in 1863 would graduate from the United States Naval Academy in 1884. A decorated naval officer in the First World War, he would serve as the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet in the 1920s. The senior Jones’s battalion was originally constituted on June 17, 1862 and though assigned to the reserve corps, seemed to be associated frequently with D.H. Hill’s division. Artillery chief William Pendleton’s original order constituting the battalion alludes to this.[5] Jennings Cropper Wise (The Long Arm of Lee Volume 1: Bull Run to Fredericksburg) also states that this battalion was assigned to D.H. Hill.[6] Jones’s battalion consisted of four Virginia batteries and had between 14-16 guns. The Carmen-Copes maps do not break out the individual batteries. The battalion included Captain Richard C.M. Page’s (Morris “Louisa”) battery of four twelve-pound howitzers; and Captain Jefferson Peyton’s (Richmond “Orange”) battery of one 3-inch ordnance rifle, one 12-pound howitzer, and three six-pound howitzers. The battalion also included Captain Abram Wimbish’s (Long Island) battery and Captain William H. Turner’s Company D (Goochland) of Wise’s Legion). Less is known of the last two units. Harsh says that the Goochland battery was unfit to leave Virginia.[7] They had between them 5-7 guns of unknown size. Both would be consolidated with Jones other two batteries in the October 4, 1862 reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia’s artillery.[8] Early in the morning, Jones' artillery battalion was positioned on the ridge north of Cemetery Hill facing generally toward the Antietam to contest any crossing of the middle bridge. However it was heavily engaged by Union artillery across the creek and was ordered by General Lee to a more protected position. It was around this time that Jones witnessed the famous incident where an artillery round fired by Captain Stephen Weed of Battery I, 5^th U.S. Artillery clipped the front legs off of D.H. Hill’s horse while, he, Lee and Longstreet were observing the battle on the ridge north of the Boonsboro Road. Lee and Longstreet had wisely dismounted to avoid drawing fire from the Union guns.[9] Later in the morning Jones re- occupied the ridge with three batteries, two guns of R.C.M. Page's Battery was placed close to the Keedysville road, to fire to the front, in the direction of the middle bridge and the other guns so arranged that their field of fire was off to the left, and then opened fire on Richardson's Division, firing solid shot, which struck the ground in front of the column, Jones says "with wonderful effect.”

Major John Selden Saunders Artillery Battalion accompanied Richard Anderson’s division as it moved on to the field around 10AM to support D.H. Hill’s beleaguered brigades. Saunders, an 1858 graduate of West Point served as an ordnance officer at the Washington Arsenal at the start of the war when he resigned on April 22, 1861 shortly after Virginia’s secession.[10] He was the son of Commander John L. Saunders, U. S. N. and future brother in law of Lee’s adjutant general Walter Taylor. His artillery battalion was composed of Huger's Virginia battery of 4 guns, commanded by Captain Frank Huger; the Portsmouth Battery, 4 guns, commanded by Captain Carey F. Grimes; Moorman's Lynchburg Battery, 4 guns, commanded by Captain M.M. Moorman; and the Donaldsonville, Louisiana, Battery, commanded by Captain Victor Maurin. In the absence of Major John S. Saunders, the battalion was under the command of Captain Grimes. The battalion moved through Sharpsburg and up the Hagerstown road and went into position on the ridge northwest from Piper's barn. Grimes, leading his own battery, went into position about 60 yards to the right of the road; Moorman was on Grimes right and 50 yards west of the barn, and Huger and Maurin were west of the road. The four batteries opened fire on French’s division. Their fire was effective on the right of the 14th Indiana, but of no particular effect upon other parts of French’s line. Counter battery fire from Tompkins battery and the long-range guns of the Federal Artillery Reserve beyond the Antietam enfiladed Saunders guns. Musket fire from the 14^th Indiana joined in and soon silenced them and they were forced to withdraw. Grimes was struck from his horse by a shot in the thigh. As his men were bearing him from the field, he was mortally wounded by a second ball that struck him in the groin. Meanwhile the other batteries had re-opened fire but were quickly silenced and withdrawn. Moorman's Battery was badly used up and retired into park two miles from the field in the direction of Shepherdstown. Grimes' Battery followed and Huger's Battery, abandoning one gun because its horses had been killed, followed Moorman and Grimes. Later in the day, troops from George T. Anderson’s brigade would discover this gun. Anderson would report "I found a 6-pounder gun, and, getting a few men to assist putting it in position, a lieutenant of infantry, whose name or regiment I do not know, served it most handsomely until the ammunition was exhausted." The officer who served it was Lieutenant William A. Chamberlaine of the 6th Virginia, of Mahone's Brigade. Chamberlaine was assisting in rallying men in the Hagerstown road, when he noticed the abandoned gun and with the aid of a few men, mostly of G.T. Anderson's Brigade, but some of the 6th Virginia, ran it up the road about 100 yards, nearly to the top of the ridge, where it opened fire upon Richardson's men, moving through the cornfield, but the exposure here was so great that, after two or three shots, it was run back to the mouth of the Piper lane. Here several shots were fired and the gun continued in action until Richardson's line fell back. A marker on the Hagerstown Pike marks the spot where Chamberlaine engaged the Federals. It is one of the very few monuments on the battle dedicated to confederate units at Antietam.

Also appearing for a time before noon was a section of Captain William K. Bachman’s (Charleston “German”) South Carolina Battery of Major Bushrod Washington Frobel’s Artillery Battalion of Hood’s Division. Bachman had two Blakeleys and four Napoleons coming into the battle.[11] Carmen reports that a section of this battery that started the day on Cemetery Hill was ordered to the left along with Miller’s battery. The battery appears on the 10:30 map in the cornfield behind the Sunken Road.

At about the noon hour, the hard-hitting Federal forces under Richardson managed to dislodge the decimated Confederate forces in the Sunken Road forcing them back on to the Piper Farm. For much of that early afternoon, the Confederate artillery was all that stood between the surging Federals and the town of Sharpsburg. Several other gallant Confederate batteries were instrumental in this defense.

One of these was Captain James William Bondurant’s (Jeff Davis) Alabama Battery of Major Scipio Francis Pierson’s Artillery Battalion of D.H. Hill’s Division. This battery had played a key role two days earlier in holding off the Ninth Corps attacks at Fox’s Gap. Once again, it was thrown into the breech along the Piper Lane. Bondurant reports only having two guns, a three-inch rifle and 12-pound howitzer, present on the line. This section appears on both the 12:00 and 1:00 PM maps along the lane behind the eastern part of the orchard.[12]

Perhaps the most famous anecdote about Longstreet’s role in the Battle of Antietam is when his staff took over two nearly abandoned guns and faced down the onrushing Federal Second Corps infantry behind the Sunken Road. As the staff load and fire the pieces, the general calmly holds the reins of their horses all the while chomping determinedly on a cigar. Longstreet’s staff is aiding Captain M.B. Miller’s Battery (3^rd Company Washington Louisiana Artillery), Reserve Artillery, Longstreet’s Command. At about 9:15 a.m., this battery of 4 Napoleon guns was ordered from its position on Cemetery hill to the left to Piper's orchard to a position near the center of the orchard, and about 100 yards south of the cornfield in front. In taking position a rain of bullets came showering over it from the right, left and in front, it immediately opened fire on Richardson's advance. In a very short time two gunners and several cannoneers were wounded and Longstreet ordered the battery to cease firing and go under cover, by withdrawing a few yards down the hill. Here it remained 20 minutes, "when, the enemy again advancing, the battery again took position. Captain Miller found himself the only officer with his company, and, having barely enough men left to work a section effectively, he opened upon the enemy with his two pieces with splendid effect. After an action of half an hour he moved his section to a more advantageous position 100 yards to the front and right, placing the remaining section under Sergeant Ellis, directing him to take it completely under cover. He then continued the action until the ammunition was nearly exhausted, when Sergeant Ellis brought up one of the remaining caissons. The enemy had made two determined attempts to force our line, and had been twice signally repulsed. They were now advancing the third time, and were within canister range, when Sergeant Ellis, who had succeeded in rallying some infantry to his assistance, brought one of the guns of his section into action on Miller's left, and gave them canister, with terrible effect. The three guns succeeded in checking the enemy's advance." Longstreet was with Miller's guns at this time, and, as Miller was short handed, by reason of his loss of cannoneers, Longstreet's staff assisted in working the guns, while their chief held the horses, and directed the fire of the guns. Longstreet writes:

"Miller was short of hands and ammunition, even for two guns. (?) Our line was throbbing at every point, so that I dared not call on General Lee for help. As Richardson advanced through the corn he cut off the battery under Boyce, so that it was obliged to retire to save itself, and as Barlow came upon our center, the battery on our left was for a time thrown out of fire lest they might injure friend as well as foe. Barlow marched in steady good ranks, and the remnants before him rose to the emergency. They seemed to forget that they had known fatigue, the guns were played with life; and the brave spirits manning them claimed that they were there to hold or to go down with the guns. As our shots rattled against the armored ranks, Colonel Fairfax clapped his hands and ran for other charges. The mood of the gunners to a man was of quiet but unflinching resolve to stand to the last gun. Captain Miller charged and double-charged with spherical case and canister until his guns at the discharge leaped into the air from 10 to 12 inches."

We hear the term "artillery hell" applied to the Battle of Antietam. There were few more hellish places on the battlefield than the area behind the Sunken Road. Alexander Gardner's indelible images of that bloody lane portray the sacrifice of the Confederate infantry. But just a few yards further back, a few guns of Miller, Boyce, Grimes and others, assisted by some officers of James Longstreet's staff ultimately stopped the Federal advance against Lee's vulnerable center along the second Sunken Road.

NOTE: For additional information on the Confederate artillery units, see my accompanying fact sheet posted below.

---

[1] Official Records Volume 19, Part 1, page 943

[2] Official Records Volume 19, Part 1, page 1026

[3] Official Records Volume 19, Part 1, page 840

[4] Official Records Volume 19, Part I, page 1024

[5] Official Records Volume 51, Part II, page 575

[6] Wise, Jennings Cropper. The Long Arm of Lee Volume 1 Bull Run to Fredericksburg. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991 (Reprinted from the 1915 edition)

[7] Harsh, Joseph. Sounding the Shallows. Kent: The Kent State University Press, 2000. 60.

[8] Official Records Volume 19, Part II, page 648, 653.

[9] Longstreet, James. “The Invasion of Maryland” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2 (New York: Century Co., 1887), 671

[10] Cullum, George W. Officers and Graduates of the Military Academy From 1802-1867. New York: James Miller, 1879. Page 469

[11] Johnson, Curt, and Richard C. Anderson, Jr. Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam. College Station Tex.: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 1995. 89.

[12] Johnson, Curt, and Richard C. Anderson, Jr. Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam. College Station Tex.: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 1995. 96.